Turkey, the PKK and regional stability

Ahmet O. Evin

The simmering tensions in the wake of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorism in Turkey reached a boiling point after the recent ambushes that killed scores of Turkish troops. The current crisis not only poses a serious danger of spreading further into the region, drawing other parties from the broader neighborhood into the fray, but also a very serious challenge to relations between Turkey and the US that have been deteriorating for some time. Even after the Iraq security talks in Istanbul, with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice participating after having had meetings in Ankara, it is still not clear whether Washington's and Ankara's positions have adequately converged to initiate meaningful cooperation on the issue. Convincing Turkish public opinion that Turkey's allies are lending support remains another formidable challenge.

Turkey's frustrations stem from the fact that the PKK has found a hospitable environment in northern Iraq to mount its operations into Turkey. Ankara's position, oversimplified, is that if neither the Iraqi government nor the US as the occupying power is doing anything to prevent the PKK from causing harm across the border to Turkey, then Turkey will undertake to protect its own citizens from PKK terror by mounting cross-border military operations into Iraq. Moreover, Ankara sees its own war on terrorism as part of the global war on terror that has been so loudly trumpeted by the Bush administration and, hence, expects active support from the US.

The US, as well as most EU member states, have declared the PKK a terrorist organization, although little active support has been extended to prevent attacks on Turkey. The Bush administration's priority is to achieve a modicum of stability in Iraq, where the security situation has been deteriorating. Moreover, US forces in Iraq are too overextended to be able to take on additional responsibilities in the north. In short, what the US sees as the only stable area in Iraq is in effect the area from which Turkey's security is threatened. Under the circumstances, Turkish public opinion increasingly blames the US for destabilizing Turkey's own backyard while the US fears Turkish operations might lead to a new source of conflict and instability in the region.

These diverging priorities have increased domestic tensions in Turkey. The US is increasingly being viewed as an adversary rather than an ally and is blamed for deliberately supporting the formation of an independent Kurdistan as a prelude to instigating the division of Turkey itself. With such conspiracy theories gaining currency, rising nationalism brings with it the danger of a pronounced ethnic division that Turkey did not experience even during the 15-year conflict in the southeast with the PKK that ended in 1999 with the capture (with US assistance) of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan.

Under the circumstances, Ankara has no option but to act decisively. "The time for rhetoric is over," Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan told Rice bluntly, just at about the same time General Joseph Ralston, until recently the US special envoy for countering the PKK, admitted in an interview across the Atlantic that the US had not done enough to support Turkey in this respect. Two questions remain outstanding at the moment: One is the extent of Turkish military intervention, if no other effective means are found to contain PKK terrorism after Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's meeting with President George W. Bush in Washington on Monday. The second, which flows from the first, is whether the current crisis could be resolved without (or before) it rigs into the agenda of a host of other regional security threats, such as nuclear proliferation, further ethnic divisions spreading beyond Iraq, and escalating regional conflicts dragging in other major international actors into the region.

If this worst-case scenario is avoided (as it should be), then it is not inconceivable that Turkey might be able to play a positive role in paving the way to stability, its main objective in the region. The current crisis has tested both Turkey's determination and its ability to use restraint until all other options are exhausted. It has also led to more rigorous thinking in decision-making and policy circles. What new approaches might Turkey adopt once the crisis is hopefully over and the tensions are cooled?

The first and foremost would be a serious effort to recognize and promote the citizenship and affinity of its Kurdish citizens. By all counts, support for the PKK is not widespread among Turkey's Kurds, who would rather be the citizens of the most stable and prosperous country in the neighborhood. Second, given that there is no effective government in Baghdad and there is not likely to be one in the foreseeable future, Turkey can begin thinking of the Iraqi Kurdish north as a client to be protected. Turkey, after all, can provide the only reliable window to the world for that region. It was the effective protector of the Kurdish north after the Gulf war, a crucial point that is largely forgotten now. Finally, the Turkish government, as well as policy circles, have to learn how to express themselves and communicate in an effective way so that Turkey's policies are understood in the international community.


* Published in Lebanon's THE DAILY STAR on November 06, 2007. Ahmet O. Evin is founding dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Sabanci University. He is a professor of political science at Sabanci and is a member of the board of directors of Istanbul Policy Center. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.