Imagine Al Sadr as ayatollah

Sami Moubayed

In September 2006, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani - a moderate Shiite voice by all accounts -announced that he would be stepping out of political life, appalled by the then-death toll of 792 Iraqis in a week.

This is the same man who had used his paramount influence to silence the guns of two Shiite insurgencies in 2004. He then called on his supporters (women included) to vote for the political process, claiming that it was a "religious duty" to jump-start democracy in Iraq.

Sources close to the disenchanted ayatollah confirmed that he was very upset that many Iraqi Shiites were obeying young clerics and ignoring his advice. He was referring to Moqtada Al Sadr.

Shortly before this announcement, which went by greatly unnoticed in the Arabic press, fighting broke out between Sadrists and Iraqi soldiers in Diwaniyya. Al Sistani called for calm. Nobody listened to him and as a result 73 people were killed.

When a grieving Iraqi comes to Ali Al Sistani and complains that his brother had been murdered by one of the death squads roaming the streets of Baghdad, the elderly ayatollah tells him to have faith in heavenly justice. He reads a phrase from the Quran, then tells him to take his case to court.

Unsatisfied by Al Sistani's words of wisdom, the grieving man heads on to Al Sadr's office in Najaf and repeats the same complaint. Al Sadr listens attentively, then asks for the names of the suspected -or confirmed - culprits. He then sends somebody off - and kills them.

In times like these, when lawlessness prevails, this is what ordinary Iraqis seek: protection and revenge. These are two traits that Al Sistani cannot offer (due to his godfatherly status) but yet Al Sadr (who is 42 years his junior) can provide.

Al Sadr is a phenomenon worth observing in Iraq. Rising out of personal obscurity, having lived all his life in the shadow of his father, he has risen - in a remarkable period of four-years - to become one of the most powerful figures in Iraq. He controls the slums of Baghdad, along with the minds and hearts of poor and young people, in addition to - until recently - 30 seats in Parliament and four portfolios in the cabinet of Prime Minister Nouri Al Malki. Al Sadr meets his supporters every day and distributes favours to all those around him. He operates a strong charity network, cares for the families of those who are wounded or killed in combat, and has build a name for himself as an uncorrupted leader who lives a monastic life.

He uses - with great skill - the "patron-client" system of Arab politics, offering the masses his protection in exchange for their allegiance. Since then, Al Sistani's influence has been reduced dramatically, at will. Al Sadr on the other hand, has been working to face-lift his image. For long portrayed as a thug, he now tries to preach reconciliation with the Sunnis to enhance his powerbase in the Muslim community (no doubt, inspired by his Lebanese counterpart Hassan Nasrallah). He has put a lot of effort into the charity network that he operates, the stipends he sends to needy families, and his family's website www.alsader.com, inspired by the multi-language website www.sistani.org, which attracts more than three million people/month from Iran alone. Shunning cameras and interviews, he is again creating a mystical aura around himself, just like Al Sistani, who is never seen in public.

What Al Sadr has and Al Sistani doesn't, however, is a militia. The Mahdi Army, labelled for long as a terrorist organisation by the United States, has started to re-structure itself, under Al Sadr's orders. He wants to fire all undisciplined members, and recruit new, fresh people who are well-educated, organised, and can do wonders to his image in the upper classes of the Shiite community.

He wants to divide the Mahdi Army into two fronts: one that is military, to protect ordinary Shiites, stage demonstrations, solve problems - and create others when needed. The other branch would cultural/political/social, to lobby for the party founder in different domains Iraqi society. Those who might give Al Sadr a bad name have been fired.

The one flaw that Al Sadr has and which haunts him day and night, is a lack of religious legitimacy. He remains, despite his dramatic political influence, a nobody in religious affairs, while Al Sistani is the supreme master, not only in Iraq but throughout the Muslim world.

Iranian living in Iraq

Al Sistani is one of the brains of Shiite Islam, matched only by the Iranian Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Ali Akbar Mohtashemi. Al Sistani, who is an Iranian living in Iraq, is seen by Al Sadr as a foreigner because he speaks Arabic with a Persian accent, and does not even hold an Iraqi passport.

This inferiority complex might explain why Al Sadr has announced in mid-December 2007, that he will be returning to his religious studies. He wants to match Al Sistani. He actually needs to match Al Sistani. Al Sadr is now aiming for the religious rank of mujtahid (Islamic jurisprudent), at the hands of the Afghan Ayatollah Mohammad Ishaq Al Fayyad.

Currently, he is not authorised to issue religious fatwas (edicts). When he is asked religious questions he must refer to clerics more senior than he is, such as Al Sistani. When he reaches the rank of mujtahid, Al Sadr will be "allowed" to teach books then publish them, answering questions on daily affairs related to Islam, and issuing his own fatwas. He plans on becoming an ayatollah, just like Al Sistani, by 2010.

Just imagine an Ayatollah Moqtada Al Sadr, who is king among the young and the rich people, who has family heritage, religious legitimacy, and political power, who commands a majority in parliament, imposes his ministers on government - and has a political and military machine to uphold his ambitions. That might be Iraq, 2010.

Published in UAE’s GULF NEWS on December 24, 2007