Unless there is urgent anticipation of some confrontation involving Israel and taking place in Lebanon after Mughniyyeh's forty-day mourning period and Hezbollah's potential revenge for his assassination, the Russian awakening over what they refer to as the mandatory implementation of Resolution 1701 may actually be concealing an understanding with the Americans over the limitations and outcomes of a military confrontation.
It is not foolish to assume the success of the negotiations over this understanding during the Rice-Lavrov talks in Moscow on the eve of Lavrov's Middle Eastern tour, especially as the meeting ended abruptly with American assurances to the Russians that froze the dispute over the missile shield. This was followed by a tougher Russian stand towards Damascus and explicit support for "Lebanon's constitutional regime, its lawful institutions, sovereignty and independence." Although it goes without saying that the Russian support will be translated into efforts that oppose the attempts by Lebanon's pro-Syrian opposition to change the regime, it is unusual for Russia to take advantage of the confrontations inside the Ain el-Helweh Camp to announce a position identical to the American vision of crises in Lebanon…After all, those confrontations are known to follow a predictable pattern.
The surprise inside the camp was the revival of Jund al-Sham after its death; the surprise in the Kremlin's position was not only its warning about an "open conflict" in Lebanon and its regional consequences should the sides with military capabilities to overturn the balance of power lose their self-restraint, but also in the Russian unequivocal call for the mandatory implementation of Security Council resolutions that prohibit arming political parties. Consequently, this also applies to Hezbollah, especially as Moscow has repeatedly denied that advanced Russian weapons were smuggled to Hezbollah through Syria.
Naturally, the Russian warning builds up more fears, because while it may support certain probabilities of what may come, it can also be understood as an advice to avoid resorting to arms in Lebanon because none of the sides will have the ability to control reactions or confine the scope of the confrontation. This advice applies in the period following the summit in which Lebanon's presence will be dominant even if it chooses to absent itself. The apprehension worsens when noting the rising voices within the opposition to hold the parliamentary majority "responsible for the post-summit consequences" if the Siniora government decides to boycott the summit. Will these consequences be limited to mobilizing supporters against the government?
Ironically, the very warning that came just days before the summit offered an immediate solution to the crisis, calling onto the government and the opposition to represent Lebanon at the summit with a joint delegation that carries with it a proposal to resolve Lebanon's crisis. In other words, what the French initiative and later the Arab initiative could not accomplish in months may be miraculously resolved in one week.
Assuming the probable extension of the presidential impasse in Lebanon after the summit, will the Arab League be able to reconcile the Egyptian preference for the gradual implementation of the Arab initiative with the Syrian rejection of this approach and insistence on an integrated basket of solutions? Will the Syrian-Saudi disagreement get worse, especially if a new phase of mobile confrontations begins in Lebanon when at the same time the March 14 Movement prepares for the possibility of getting "punished" for its role in disturbing and obstructing the summit through its known efforts to reduce the level of official Arab representation there?
For most Lebanese, the post-summit period means eliminating the cap of political calm and opening the gates wide for security deterioration. Just as Fateh al-Islam fought a war of attrition against the Lebanese army, the only institution that has maintained its solidarity while vacuum governs the role of institutions to resolve conflicts, it is now feared that Lebanon will be engaged in wars of attrition in which the only survivor in the battlefields for settling scores will be the "general" of void.
While Israel and Washington still have their eye on Hezbollah's arsenal, regardless of its responsibility for the crisis and its resolution - and just as Moscow heads towards the "mandatory" implementation of Resolution 1701 and limiting arms to the legitimate Lebanese state - the US Undersecretary Jeffrey Feltman's frustration with Hezbollah inability to join the political process in Lebanon may be another way of mourning the Arab initiative, a mourning that is delayed until after the summit.
* Published in the London-based AL-HAYAT on March 24, 2008. |
