Such fears have coincided with developments in Pakistan, a country which has become a Pandora's Box of explosive surprises. Pakistan remains an integral part of US strategic security and entails various fears: that of nuclear proliferation, of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, of potentially offering refuge to Osama Bin Laden on its territories, and of the nightmare of a potential outbreak of uncontrollable chaos. Since Pervez Musharraf was forced to resign, doubts have been raised as to whether Barack Obama has the political shrewdness to understand Pakistan's internal dynamics and its relationship with its neighbors, and to make decisions with the promptness which developments sometimes demand.
Barack Obama may not be the only candidate to fall victim to Putin and Assad, although they both are very keen on seeing him, rather than John McCain, become the next President of the United States, as they assume that his nature and political personality are more reassuring. French President Nicolas Sarkozy may also be added to the list of victims, with the difference that, while Obama is a presidential candidate, Sarkozy is president.
Sarkozy was quick to fall into Russia's trap when he failed to recognize the importance of "sovereignty" and "territorial integrity" of Georgia, and prematurely boasted reaching an immediate solution for the accelerating events in South Ossetia. He thought that he had "discovered gunpowder" when he formulated the six points, and that postponing the discussion over sovereignty had been an accomplishment. The fact of the matter is that Sarkozy has implicated the European Union, which he currently presides. He was blinded by his vanity, and his team followed behind sheepishly right to where Putin wanted: in his grip. Sarkozy has repeated with Putin the same mistake he made with Assad, that of being hasty and of allowing himself to be misled, with a mixture of arrogance and compensation for a lack of self-esteem, without taking well into consideration the repercussions and consequences involved. Assad's comparison of the relationship between Russia and Georgia to that of Syria and Lebanon is perhaps useful in this context, as, in both cases, Sarkozy has lacked the ability to anticipate and predict both Russia's intentions and objectives in Georgia and Syria's intentions and objectives in Lebanon.
All of a sudden, Sarkozy found himself faced with Russia's clear determination to annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia, irrespective of commitments, accomplishments and the six points. He will also find himself faced with Syria's clear determination to regain control over Lebanon, to help Iran to impose its hegemony on the Middle East, and to use Paris to strip of efficiency or momentum the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, intended to prosecute those implicated in political assassinations in Lebanon, and particularly in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and his companions.
Sarkozy has become involved in the diplomacy of reaching agreements, searching for goodwill, offering time and postponing deadlines to allow for stalling and imposing de facto realities. The disadvantages of such a diplomatic and political method will soon be revealed through the actions of Putin and Assad. This in turn will place Obama, who has repeatedly called for a similar brand of diplomacy, in a position where his philosophy, personality, rationale and political thought will be subjected to skepticism.
This does not mean that Putin and Assad will always emerge victorious, along with their allies in Iran, China and Venezuela, as well as Hezbollah, Hamas and other organizations in different parts of the world.
Putin, for example, has made several strategic mistakes, for which he may later pay a price, regardless of whether John McCain or Barack Obama is elected president. Indeed, Putin has withdrawn himself from the big players' club, even if he still assumes that he will preserve his status as "great man" for Russia. He has behaved in a way that made him abruptly lose the trust he had enjoyed as a partner in several fields. He has become a party with suspicious intentions where he had been a partner in today's realities and tomorrow's aspirations.
Another, most likely unintentional, mistake made by Putin was that he may have brought down the very man he had wished to see become President of the United States. He has mobilized public opinion against him (as a result of his actions in Georgia) and against any form of understanding with him, as well as against the notion of pursuing diplomatic and political appeasement through resorting to dialogue and negotiations as a means of resolving crises. In other words, Putin may have done away with the concept of friendly dialogue as a magical means to resolve major problems, as Obama would have wished.
Furthermore, Putin has turned Europe's attention back to a traditionally familiar Russian "hostility". He reminded the world of the fact that, nearly a decade ago, the West saved Russia's economy by absolving it of its large debts, only to find itself faced with ingratitude and targeted by the Russian oil empire which Putin and his partners are building. All this will have negative repercussions. In fact, repercussions will not only come from the US or Europe, as Putin may have to face the Russian upper class, which will ask him: what have you done, and why have our prosperity, our comfort and our right to enjoy life become objects of belittlement and anger? After all, they are today at the heart of European luxury, after having savored the pleasures of spending money in the post-Soviet era, and they now face the threat of punishment if matters continue to deteriorate.
In fact, they are likely to deteriorate further, with the US on one side and European countries on the other. Furthermore, there are indications of deteriorating relations in a group context, not only with respect to the relationship with NATO or within the G-8, but also within the Security Council, which monitors the balance of conciliation or confrontation, and where the atmosphere of détente or escalation is reflected in regional issues.
Until very recently, the belief among some, including perhaps members of Obama's camp, was that Russia was indispensable, especially in dealing with issues like Iran. Even George Bush's administration focused on the centrality and vitality of collective action regarding the Iranian issue, and on the dire need for consensus over it.
Now that Russia has withdrawn from its position of partnership, neither the US nor any other state can be blamed if it decides to replace its reliance on the partnership with Russia to constantly flirt with Iran and offer it leeway, with a decisive warning to Iran to end its pursuit of nuclear armament, its domination of Iraq, and its use of Lebanon as a military base through Hezbollah.
The language of collective sanctions will be ineffective at the Security Council, as a result of the Russian-Chinese veto in matters regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran, violations of Mugabe the dictator in Zimbabwe, the despotic regime in Myanmar, or the stance towards Syria.
However, the space for impunity and procrastination will from now on shrink further, as a result of the collapse of collective action in the era of affiliation to polarized alliances. With such a collapse, the opportunities for unilateral measures outside of the Security Council will increase.
Thus, Iran for example, or Syria, may lose the "protection" for which it has received a pledge from Russia, as a result of the veto wars and the downfall of collective action in the Security Council. If the Syrian president assumes that he has delivered a "masterful blow" by stabbing the European Union in the back, and undermining efforts aimed at bringing him closer to the US and allowing for the exchange of ambassadors, he will soon discover that he has prematurely involved himself with a Russian pole, at a yet inconclusive stage in Russian-European and American-Russian relations.
He may in fact pay a double price for announcing his position to offer Syria as a base for Russian missiles and a harbor for the Russian fleet. Such announcements are heard clearly by both Barack Obama and John McCain. If Obama had any urge to reach an understanding with Assad and his regime, that urge has become seriously diminished following Syria's proposal. Moreover, if Europe had any intention to embrace the Syrian president, then his statements will be taken as an untimely and uncalled for interference. If Damascus is relying on constant Russian protection, it may soon find itself without a protective shield.
At such a turning point, Syria is not as prominent on the US's radar as are Iran, Pakistan, Iraq or Russia. Iraq has entered a phase of moving towards stability, while Pakistan has entered a phase of fear of instability and chaos. The Bush administration made a grave mistake when it assumed that it could return Benazir Bhutto to assume the civil aspect of power, while retaining for Pervez Musharraf his military role. Such a plan may have worked had Bhutto not been assassinated. In the end, Pakistan today lays in the grip of the unknown, with the exception of what we already know of the corruption of Bhutto's husband, now a partner in government, and of the radicalism and vindictive tendencies of the other partner, Nawaz Sharif.
History may one day vindicate Pervez Musharraf and recognize him as the man who purged the higher echelons of the military establishment of Islamic radicalism. However, Pakistan's next phase is frightening, as it remains the Pandora's Box of explosive surprises.
The events in Georgia have revealed the true face of Putin's Russia, which he wishes to see at the head of an international empire of oil and gas at any price. They have also resulted in a drop in Obama's numbers in trust polls in various American states. Developments in Pakistan have also increased suspicions about Obama's abilities and the impact of his limited experience in international politics. This does not mean that John McCain will surely win the elections. What such events imply is that the escalatory strategies of international players during US elections will not only have repercussions for those who see the electoral period as an opportunity to transgress, but may also affect them by bringing down the candidate whom they wish to see reaching the White House.
Published in the London-based DAR AL-HAYAT on August 22, 2008. |
