Whoever planned this scenario is one thing, but whoever gets stuck with it and bears the heavy price is a completely different matter. But is the fire in the Caucasus merely a blow to avenge the independence of Kosovo that was imposed by NATO? Or is it a preemptive strike to tame western aspirations at the Kremlin's doorsteps and to impose the conditions of a new form of partnership with the new White House resident?
Moscow's rush to return Georgia's blow by resorting to the diplomacy of fire to break its arm in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, cannot be seen as an attempt to take advantage of the "inattention" of the American preoccupied with his elections, in the hope of reshaping the map molded with the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Taking advantage can only be maximized with the Kremlin's awareness of two basic facts: Europe's need for Russian energy supplies, and NATO's awareness of the repercussions of responding to the going-all-the-way policy which Putin had passed over to his successor, Medvedev.
NATO's dilemma lies in that it has received and understood the Russian message. The alliance is fully aware that if the conflict expands, its embarrassment will only get worse, especially that, since the end of the Cold War, it has pulled off its options the policy of muscle flexing with Moscow, even if by proxy. NATO's dilemma is that while it remains hesitant about accepting Georgia's membership, it knows that, after the Russian disciplining, Georgia will keep the fires of revenge raging and that the open war with the big "renegade" - which France has branded as an international outlaw - will be nothing short of a world war, a war deterred by its prohibitive cost.
The provocation was in the first place American, one of the remains of the neoconservatives. Still, there are a few in Europe who believe that the Medvedev-Putin team chose their approach to return the blows, especially that most Europeans have no love left for George Bush as an ally. Instead, they let him occupy Iraq unilaterally at first and then they let him implicate them in the Afghanistan war. They stood against the stick approach to stop Iran from possessing nuclear weapons when the new dilemma came from the east, from a "partner" capable of using the veto power inside the Security Council.
Despite the eloquence of the German warning against those who lightly play with fire on all fronts; despite the Italian warning against the Balkanization of the Caucasus, the reality is that classifying the Kremlin as an international outlaw will encourage the camp of "rogue countries," the enemies in the eyes of Washington, to provoke the Kremlin towards more defiance.
North Korea has frozen the disassembly of its nuclear facilities under the pretext that it needs its name cleared off the American list of terrorism-sponsoring states. Tehran, likewise, seizes every possible opportunity, as the arm of the Revolutionary Guard waves to the Shiites in the region to get ready to deliver a blow to Israel if it lays a finger on Iran.
Shortly earlier, neither Europe nor the region was happy when Khamenei prematurely announced the extension of Ahmedinejad's term especially since the latter is not willing to give up on the slogan of his first term, namely wiping Israel off the map.
The renegades are united by costly defiance against the American whose greed and ulterior motives they have always suspected. The European is now paying the price of Bush's recklessness, tormented by his inability to stand up to the Kremlin's defiance while the bill of reconciliation and regaining pride remains unknown.
Meanwhile, in the Middle East and the Gulf, what was difficult to coexist with during the phase of shaping regional roles among "emerging" powers may now become far more bitter and practically inevitable.
*Published in the London-based AL HAYAT on August 28, 2008. |
