" Today, Qaeda intends to spread its control over Yemen, or take complete control of some of its regions; it tries to do so by exploiting the chaotic circumstances that are emerging in the country because of the rebellion of the Huthis, and the restiveness of the southerners " Now the Yemeni authorities are screaming for help against the real Qaeda. However, how can Qaeda be confronted in a country whose terrain is difficult, whose central authority is weak, whose resources are poor, and which is targeted by foreign powers? The picture suggests a new Afghanistan, but not completely yet.
If the Yemeni authorities made a mistake in the past, it was in begging too frequently for help in confronting the danger of terrorism, while at that time they used to refuse to deal with that danger in a serious way. The Yemeni authorities used to think that Qaeda was a foreign danger that primarily frightened the United States, and that there was no reason to exhaust the state defense resources on a problem that concerned a foreign group. Also the authorities in Sanaa, similar to what other countries considered before the situation in Yemen developed, thought that the country's political stance would protect it from the evil deeds of Qaeda. This is despite the fact that Qaeda carried out its first operation in the waters of Aden before the events Sept. 9, 2001.
The political interpretation at that time of all the attacks carried out by Qaeda against embassies, service centers, and foreigners was that they were operations against foreign targets. Today, Qaeda intends to spread its control over Yemen, or take complete control of some of its regions; it tries to do so by exploiting the chaotic circumstances that are emerging in the country because of the rebellion of the Huthis, and the restiveness of the southerners.
Qaeda, as its observers understand, is no longer the private organization of Bin Laden. It has been transformed into a huge machine linked to major regional regimes, such as Iran. The Iranians themselves do not deny that there is some kind of a relationship, but they give various justifications. There are many indications that link Qaeda to Iranian apparatuses with regard to arming, passage, and the joint stances as the two sides become active together, and calm down together, as they do for instance in Iraq.
Whether it is Qaeda or organizations cloned from it, the increase in the number of the terrorist groups in the mountainous regions is something that is confirmed by the news reports, which indicate that we are on the verge of a new chapter of terrorism that might be no less dangerous than the terrorism that harmed Iraq.
The critical situation in Yemen makes it imperative for all the Arab countries concerned in the region to extend a helping hand as soon as possible to the Sanaa Government, to encourage it to be prepared for what is happening to its country, and to start its battle before the infiltrating armed men do so. |