Iranian protests, the Turkish paradigm and wishful thinking

Ufuk Ulutaş

The latest developments in Iran following the recent highly disputed presidential elections have created a wishful political atmosphere which has been characterized by hasty conclusions.

Not only ordinary people who follow the news from mainstream media, but also some intellectuals, researchers and even policymakers were presumptuous to conclude that the street protests in Iran were to bring a regime change for good, and that the protesters represent the “holy war” of liberal democracy vis-à-vis the theocracy of the mullahs—or Islamism—in Iran.

Comparing the recent protests with the extensive street protests, strikes, resignations and demonstrations which were carried out successfully on the eve of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the aforementioned people of pen and decision offered blind support to the protesters to make the belated regime change in Iran possible. However, this blind support, based upon wishful thinking, has yet again exposed the fact that a careful and comparative study of history and culture is a sine qua non to understand the current events and predict their outcomes.

We recently read many examples of this wishful thinking, lacking historicity, in the press. In one of those articles, starting with a tone that is mainstream in Washington policy-making circles and ending with a historically questionable proposition, the author, an expert on Turkey, refers to a paradigm shift in the Middle East. He argues that the recent protests in Iran are a “popular outburst against the Islamic regime” and that the message of the Iranian people through these protests is crystal clear: “Islamism belongs to the past and it is time to move on.” He goes on to say that “this is why demands by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the guardian of the Islamist regime, to stop the demonstrations have gone unheeded.” In this sense, he asserts, the Iranian people are challenging Islamism -- creating a paradigm shift -- with their call for liberal democracy. With their call for liberal democracy, Iran would replace Turkey, which has a party in power rooted in Islamism, as the new popular, regional paradigm. Finally, he writes with a tone of ambiguity regarding the basis of his argument that “it is often said that Iran and Turkey are the two great rival political models of the Middle East. That is indeed the case, when one goes up, the other goes down.”

There are several assumptions within the confines of such a short article. First, Iranian protesters were actually anti-Islamist regime and pro-liberal democracy. These protests could have the potential to overthrow the Islamic regime. Liberal democracy was the political system that would follow the theocracy of the mullahs in Iran. Turkey is a proponent of a dying regional paradigm, i.e., Islamism. Iran and Turkey are indeed two great rival political models of the Middle East. Last but not least, when either Iran or Turkey goes up, the other goes down.

Role of ulama

Any serious analysis on Iranian history and politics should start by mentioning the role of the ulama. Many studies have shown the ulama's significance in creating a base for reform and change in Iran. We have seen the ulama taking a lead in many turning points in modern Iranian history, such as the constitutional revolution of 1905 and the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The prominent role given to the ulama by Twelver Shiism, their unique social (their ties with ordinary people, etc.), economic (religious taxes and foundations, etc.) and religious power (Velayat-e Faqih, etc.) have made them virtually inviolable in Iran. They not only control religious affairs, but also own and oversee economic enterprises through foundations. This inviolability has rendered futile any protests or uprisings in Iran without wide support from the ulama class, and it does not appear that this futility will be changing in the near future.

It is true that the protesters received implicit support (they also got explicit support from Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani) from some of the ulama based on the belief that the government had lost its legitimacy. However, one would argue that for those ulama, the election results were under question, not the regime itself. The protesters do not retain enough social, political and religious power to be able to defy the authority of the remaining core of the ulama, who are much more powerful than those who implicitly endorsed the protests. At the end of the day, it would be quite naïve to expect from the ulama to limit -- let alone abolish -- their social, economic and religious power, which seems to be the only feasible way for Iran to attain a liberal democratic polity. To cut a long history short, recent protests will not have the capacity to change the regime in Iran any time soon, primarily because they are not adequately backed by the center of the power structure in the Iranian society, i.e., the ulama.

Another question mark may be put over the opposition's ultimate aim with the protests. I think generalizing the protests as a manifestation of a demand for liberal democracy vis-à-vis the theocracy of the mullahs is not very convincing at best. Especially when one considers the leading figures of the opposition, Mir Hossein Mousavi and the man behind the curtain, Rafsanjani, the chairman of the Assembly of Experts. Mousavi's platform is quite equivocal, and his political record and associations do not give the impression that he would follow a radical reformist route and challenge the authority of established institutions of the Islamic regime. At this point, not Mousavi's challenge to the Islamist regime, but his close relationship with Rafsanjani explains why Khamenei's demands to stop the protests have gone unheeded. As many observers have noted, the 20-year rivalry between Khamenei and Rafsanjani came to a head in this conflict, and this rivalry does not stem mainly from ideological clashes. As Karim Sadjadpour, a political analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, puts it, “It's an Iranian version of the Corleones and the Tattaglias.” (The New York Times; June 21, 2009)

There is no doubt that Turkey and Iran are two great political models in the Middle East; however, the term “rival” needs a big question mark. We can talk about such rivalry back in the 16th and 17th centuries, when the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran fought over control of Mesopotamia, as a result of which the Ottomans prevailed. Since then and until the Islamic revolution in Iran, one could argue, both states followed somewhat similar lines of political development. We see a transition from dynastic monarchy to constitutional monarchy in both states during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The establishment of the Turkish Republic was followed by the ascension of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. Far from being rival political models, both states experienced a very similar period of top-down modernization in the 1920s, '30s and '40s. Many studies also suggest that a vast majority of Iran's autocratic economic, legal and educational “reforms” got their inspiration from Kemal Atatürk's Turkey. (See, for example, Said Amir Arjomand's “The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran.”)

The Islamic revolution of 1979 constitutes the major difference between the Turkish and Iranian lines of political development. An Islamic republic was established in Iran, and the government and institutions were reorganized along Shiite religious lines. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Iran was going deep down in the spectrum of political development with the Islamic revolution. What did Turkey have to offer as a rival political model against the Iranian regime during those years? There was Shiite authoritarianism in Iran and military authoritarianism and a tutelage regime in Turkey. Iran had a constitution written by the mullahs, and Turkey had a constitution written by generals. There were many restrictions on political activity and personal freedom in both countries, and we can prolong the list of similarities. Which country was actually going up and which country was going down?

Emphasis on democracy

Admit it or not, the regional paradigm that is exemplified by the rise of Islamist parties within a democratic polity is already a thing of the past in the region, at least for Turkey. For Turkey, this paradigm died more than a decade ago with the postmodern coup d'état in 1997. The subsequent ban of the Welfare Party (RP) in 1998 and the Virtue Party (FP) in 1999 ended the era of strong Islamist politics in Turkey. It was not the fervor of Islamism but an emphasis on conservative democracy and liberal economy that brought the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to power in 2002 during a period of political and economic chaos in Turkey. It was again a strong emphasis on democracy (the counter-ultimatum) that was decisive in the AK Party's victory in the 2007 elections. Therefore, the Turkish experience has yet again showed that people abhor authoritarianism, whether it be Islamist or secularist one. And the will of the people has the power to defy undemocratic and repressive institutions. Consequently, Turks have created a new regional paradigm and have been transforming into a more democratic polity. This new regional paradigm (the Turkish paradigm) is characterized by conservative democracy, a liberal economy and a multidimensional foreign policy vision. In this sense, even if Iran evolves toward a democratic polity, it would most probably follow in the footsteps of Turkey on the path of democratization.

This new paradigm has also helped Turkey to elevate its position in the region and, to a certain degree, in the world. Turkey recently established itself as a regional power, not because of US support for an already dead regional paradigm but through a wider regional and global outlook, which even clashed with American interests in the region (March 1 vote [on allowing the US and other countries to use Turkey as a base during the war on Iraq]) and challenged the rotten status quo in the Middle East (Israel-Syria peace talks and the Palestinian question). As long as Turkey retains its wider regional and global outlook and keeps evolving toward a more democratic polity, future paradigmatic shifts (whether as a result of rapprochement between Iran and the United States, or Syria and Israel, or Arab-Israeli peace) in the region will not diminish Turkey's ascendant regional power.

Destinies are all intertwined in the Middle East; when one goes up, others follow. Unfortunately, the reverse is also true.

* Published by Today's Zaman on July 9. Ufuk Ulutaş is a visiting fellow with the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) in Washington, D.C.