Hassan Haidar
It would have been expected for Iran to at least take the initiative of suspending the Vienna negotiations over its nuclear issue after accusing the United States of standing behind the bombing that targeted Revolutionary Guard leaders a few days ago. Yet it did not. Instead, it replaced it with a deliberate dispute with France over issues that have been standing for decades, and that Tehran only now remembered. But what is it that drives Tehran to take such contradictory stances: on the one hand, leveling dangerous accusations against Washington of threatening Iran’s internal security and, on the other, holding flexible negotiations with the US over a highly sensitive issue that it considers vital for its regime?
The answer too is twofold. Indeed, on the one hand, the traditional refrain remains, that of the revolution being besieged, of its enemies being numerous and of them standing as one front, regardless of any political and ideological differences, and of any disparity between their goals and approaches. This is the Iranian regime’s favorite method of dealing with the outside, which in its view is “unified”. Even if the attackers are from Jundallah, who have publicly taken responsibility for the bombing, and even if there are internal reasons and pretexts that would drive an Iranian party to resort to violence in order to defend what it considers to be its rights and interests, Tehran holds “arrogance” and its symbols (especially the United States and Britain) responsible. It should thus atone for its sins of “seducing” internal opposition movements into daring to stand up to the regime, knowing that what is actually happening is the opposite, as Washington and London move towards recognizing the legitimacy of the Iranian regime.
Here the government campaign against figures of the peaceful opposition that began after the presidential elections regains its strength, as it too has been tied to the foreign “conspiracy”. Merely two days after the bombing, a hundred Members of Parliament rushed to file a lawsuit against Mir-Hossein Mousavi because his activities have “harmed the reputation of the regime”. This means that the leadership of the reformist movement is likely in the near future to pay the price of the Baluchestan bombing, and that Tehran makes no distinction between those who protest by raising political slogans and those who blow themselves up. The regime is also waging a preemptive campaign against the West in order to tune its expected reactions – especially Paris, as it is the most critical of oppressive practices.
On the other hand, Tehran is moving forward with negotiations over the nuclear issue and showing some “sweetness” in term of discourse, as it seeks to buy time and avoid additional sanctions, which could render its economic situation similar to that of Saddam Hussein’s regime before the U.S. invasion, especially if it is decided to stop exports of oil derivatives to it.
The Iranian parliament had two days ago approved terminating government aid for food products such as wheat, sugar, rice and vegetable oil gradually over five years, as well as reducing aid for energy, which is wearing out the budget and which Iran compensates for by smuggling oil derivatives for cheap prices from Iraq. However, such a step may lead to raising the rate of inflation to above 30 percent again, and increasing the price of gasoline and electricity fourfold.
And while the government asserts that the rich are the ones benefiting from the aid, and that it will offer the poor compensation by increasing direct financial assistance to them, economists consider that such a method may cause grave damage to investments and place the country before difficult choices, being unable to borrow from abroad, such as resorting to decreasing the value of the national currency, especially as the country does not possess large monetary reserves that would enable it to fulfill its commitments towards those it considers to be its public.
*Published in the London-based AL-HAYAT on Oct. 22, 2009. |
